MAJOR COURT DECISIONS,

2004

RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. V. VERIZON
INTERNET SERVICES, INC, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir., 2003)

Issue: Whether under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Verizon must
provide the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") with the
names of its Internet subscribers who were engaged in infringing activity by
trading mp3 files consisting of copyrighted music through various peer-to-peer
programs.
Holding: It was held that §512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") provides that a subpoena may be issued to an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") only when the provider is storing infringing material on its servers. Acting as a conduit for infringing material is not sufficient to compel a
subpoena. The case was remanded to the district court to vacate the order enforcing the subpoena as well as to grant Verizon's motion to quash another
subpoena.
Description. Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, RIAA had
served subpoenas on Verizon, an ISP, to identify subscribers who were infringing copyrights of the association's members. After Verizon refused to release
their subscriber's identities, RIAA sought enforcement of the subpoenas. The
United States District Court granted RIAA's motion to compel and denied Verizon's motion to quash. Verizon appealed.
Verizon presented 3 arguments to the DC Circuit challenging the subpoenas.
First, Verizon argued that §512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act did
not provide for subpoenas to be issued to an ISP functioning "solely as a conduit for communications" of which Verizon has no control over content. If the
statute were found to authorize this type of subpoena, Verizon next contended
that the statute was unconstitutional since the district court lacked jurisdiction
to issue a subpoena lacking a "case or controversy" as required by Article III
of the Constitution. Verizon's final argument was that §512(h) of the DMCA
violated the First Amendment since it removes any ability for an Internet user
"to speak and associate anonymously" online.
Ordinarily when reviewing a district court's motion to compel, an appellate
court is looking for an abuse of discretion. However, since Verizon argued
that the district court's orders were based on an incorrect interpretation of the
statute, the court conducted a full review.
Judge Ginsberg, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, began with a review
of the text of the statute. The statute contains four, very specific safe harbors
for ISPs which provide for exemption from liability for copyright infringement. Within these safe harbors, the statute has a "notice and take-down pro-
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vision" that requires the ISP to remove or disable access to any allegedly infringing material. Verizon claimed that it cannot be served a subpoena since it
does not meet the criteria set forth in the statute, specifically, that since it does
not store the material on its servers, it cannot remove or disable any allegedly
infringing material.
The court agreed with Verizon's reading of the statute, which supports the
notion that §512(h) does not authorize the type of subpoena RIAA is seeking
since under the terms of the DMCA, the notice requirement cannot be met
since Verizon does not store any infringing materials on its server. The court
noted that it is not within its power to rewrite the DMCA in order to correct the
current problems facing the music industry. Judge Ginsberg then called upon
Congress to use its constitutional authority to correct any problems new technology may have created.
Summarized by Kendra Kosko
U.S. TELECOM ASSOCIATION V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-

359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 316 (2004)
Issue: An Order issued by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") regarding the unbundling of telecommunications network elements
raised several issues: whether the FCC subdelegation of § 251(d)(2) unbundling determinations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act") was lawful; whether the FCC's national finding of impairment for mass market
switches was consistent with the prior holding in U.S. Telecom Ass 'n v. FCC,
290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("USTA I"); whether the FCC's decision to
treat special access availability to unbundled transport facilities, more specifically, the use of tariff services, as irrelevant to the impairment analysis was
reasonable; whether the FCC's decision not to require incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") to unbundle hybrid and fiber-to-the-home
("FTTHs") loops was reasonable in the face of impairment to competitors; and
whether competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") are impaired without
unbundled access to ILEC call-related databases.
Holding: The court vacated and remanded the Order in part and denied the
petitions for review. First, the court held the FCC subdelegation of § 252(d)(2)
unbundling determinations to state commissions to be an unlawful administrative allocation of decision-making authority to an outside party. The court also
found the FCC's national finding of impairment for mass market switches to
be inconsistent with prior case law. The court previously held in USTA I that
impairment was a narrowly defined term and not all encompassing. Next, the
court found the FCC's decision to treat special access availability to unbundled
transport facilities as an irrelevant factor to the impairment analysis as reasonable since there was support in statutory language. The court then used a costSION,
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benefit analysis to conclude that the FCC's decision not to require ILEC's to
unbundle hybrid and fiber-to-the-home (FTTHs) loops was reasonable. Finally, the court held that CLECs are not impaired without unbundled access to
ILEC call-related databases since there are alternative forms of access to these
systems available.
Discussion: The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq.,
gave the FCC broad authority to require ILECs "to make 'network elements'
available to other telecommunications carriers," especially CLECs. Congress
left the decision of which elements to be 'unbundled' to the FCC if, "at a
minimum," a finding of inaccessibility to these elements would "impair" the
ability of the competitor to provide his services. In their attempt to identify
those elements to be unbundled, the courts invalidated the FCC's first two attempts. In denying the petitions for review, the Court also vacated and remanded portions of the FCC's most recent Order regarding the "scope of
obligatory unbundling." Regarding the unauthorized FCC subdelegation of §
252(d)(2) unbundling determinations to state commissions, the court held that
it is presumptively permissible to subdelegate to a subordinate federal agency.
However, in the case of outside parties like a state commission, there is no
such presumption and case law implies that these "subdelegations are assumed
improper.. .absent congressional authorization."
The Order also called for a finding of national impairment for mass-market
switches in order to take action. The court found this broad directive inconsistent with prior case law. In USTA I, the Court held that the FCC must implement a "nuanced concept of impairment." When evidence suggests variance in
the marketplace, the FCC cannot "proceed by very broad national categories"
without "exploring the possibility of.. .alternatives and reasonably rejecting
them." However, the court agreed with the FCC's decision to treat as irrelevant, for purposes of an impairment analysis, the availability of special access
to unbundled transport facilities, more specifically, the use of ILEC tariff services. In this case, competitors have "access to necessary inputs at rates" that
allow for competition, which fosters the goal of the Telecommunications Act:
creation of a "competitive market."
Because the FCC did not require ILEC's to unbundle hybrid and FTTH
loops, CLECs claimed this was an impairment on their ability to compete and,
thus, was incompatible with the Act. The court disagreed and found the FCC
decision to be reasonable since it was based on "permissible statutory considerations." Section 706(a) of the Act orders the FCC to pursue "methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment." The FCC found the cost of unbundling these loops would be a tremendous investment in infrastructure
which greatly "outweighed the benefits of removing this barrier to competition." Furthermore, the "at a minimum clause" in § 251(d)(2) allowed the FCC
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"to consider the effect on infrastructure investment" as a factor in unbundling
determinations.
Finally, the court found no impairment to CLECs who were without unbundied access ILEC call-related databases. If a CLEC had unbundled access to
ILEC mass markets, they had access to those databases. Where a CLEC had to
provide their own switches and did not have access to those databases, they
had the option to "purchase databases from the ILEC or a third party" or "self
provision." The court held there could be no impairment in the face of alternative providers. Although the court found the Order to be an "improvement
over the [FCC]'s past efforts," they still found much of the remanded work
"regrettably...unlawful."
Summarized by Diane Adams
PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-

MISSION, 373 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir. 2003)
Issue: Whether an Order adopted by the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") that changed rules regarding local and national television ownership and local radio ownership was valid under the United States Constitution,
the Telecommunications Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Holding: The Court upheld the Commission's power to regulate media ownership. The Court remanded for justification or modification of numerical limits pertaining to local television and radio ownership.
Discussion: On July 2, 2003, the FCC adopted an Order that revised several
of its regulations governing broadcast media ownership. The Commission
made the following determinations with respect to six rules:
Local Television Ownership: The Commission changed this rule to allow
television station triopolies in markets with eighteen or more television stations
and television station duopolies in markets with seventeen or fewer television
stations.
Local Radio Ownership: The Commission changed the method for determining radio markets from the "contour-overlap" method to the geographybased market delineations method created by Arbitron (a company that generates market data for radio advertisers).
Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership: The Commission repealed the ban
of common ownership of full-service television broadcast stations and daily
public newspapers in the same community. The Commission put in place a set
of guidelines that would allow such ownership (the new rules applied these
same guidelines to radio/television cross-ownership).
Radio/Television Cross-Ownership: The Commission changed its current
method for determining whether or not common ownership was permissible
for television and radio stations. This rule effectively expanded the number of
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situations in which cross-ownership would be considered permissible.
National Television Ownership: The Commission raised the audience reach
limit percentage (the percentage of households that one entity's television stations are permitted to reach) from 35% to 45%.
Dual Network Rule: The Commission declined to repeal the dual network
rule, which prohibits a television station from affiliating with more than one of
the four largest networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC).
Several public interest and consumer advocacy groups challenged the Order,
arguing that the deregulatory provisions were not permissible under the Commission's statutory mandates and also violated the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). Newspaper owners, broadcasters, and network associations,
under the view that more deregulation was needed, also petitioned for judicial
review, contending that the Commission had violated the Telecommunications
Act, the APA, and the United States Constitution by enacting these provisions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rejecting the assertion that the Constitution or § 202 of the Telecommunications Act severely
limits the Commission's ability to regulate in the public interest, upheld the
Commission's power to regulate media ownership. However, the Court found
that the Commission had not justified some of the numerical limits pertaining
to local television and radio ownership, as well as the limits placed on the
cross-ownership of media within local markets. The Court remanded for justification or modification of these numerical limits.
Summarized by Adam Hiland
MAINSTREAM MARKETING V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 358 F.3d
1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004)
Issue: Whether the opt-in telemarketing regulation, the "do-not-call registry," permitting consumers to restrict commercial sales calls violates the First
Amendment.
Holding: The court held that the do-not-call registry was a valid commercial
speech regulation, reversing the decision of the district court. The registry
does not violate the First Amendment because it directly advances the government's important interests in safeguarding personal privacy and reducing the
danger of telemarketing abuse without burdening an excessive amount of
speech.
Discussion: In order to protect the privacy of consumers, the FCC and FTC
developed the "do-not-call registry" in 2003 to prevent telemarketers from
calling consumers who sign up on the list. Telemarketing associations challenged the constitutionality of the registry and the district court held in their
favor, stating the registry was enough of a government intrusion to violate
freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Reversing the district court,

226

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 13

the Court of Appeals applied a three-part test for commercial speech, found in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N. Y, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). Central Hudson requires the government to assert and advance a
substantial government interest and also that any regulation be narrowly tailored so as to not restrict speech more than necessary. The court found that the
registry sufficiently meets the three-part test in advancing the government interest of protecting the privacy of consumers within their homes. Furthermore,
the registry is also narrowly tailored in that it only restricts telemarketing calls
to unwilling recipients. Finally, in their decision, the court also clarified that
the "do-not-call registry" is restricted to commercial speech and does not prohibit calls for purposes of political or charitable fundraisers or calls from businesses where an established business relationship already exists.
Summarized by Paul Mickelsen

